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I. INTRODUCTION
When issuing drafting corporate debt instruments, issuers
routinely place restrictive clauses in bond indentures that limit the
ability of debtholders’ ability to sue the issuer. 1 These restrictive
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1

Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC v. CompuCredit Holdings Corp., 677 F.3d
1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that a no action clause is a “standard
provision present in many trust indentures.”).

provisions are called “no action” clauses.2 A well-drafted no-action
clause protects an issuer from frivolous or unwarranted lawsuits by
preventing individual or small groups of debtholders from bringing
suits that are specious or unwelcome by the majority of the
debtholders.3 However, since no action clauses may preclude claims
from debtholders with legitimate grievances, from bringing their
claims in court, legal challenges to no action clauses frequently
arise. 4 Consequently, thoughtful, precedent-informed drafting is
essential when drafting a no action clause for a bond indenture.
While courts in the vast majority of jurisdictions agree that no
action clauses are generally enforceable, disputes concerning the
scope and interpretation of no action clauses are common. 5 The
objective of this Article is to outline the general background and
mechanics of a no action clause, draw the reader’s attention to recent
case law that may affect a court’s interpretation of a no action clause,
2

Id.

3

Conflict of Interests Between Indenture Trustee and Bondholders:
Avoidance of "No Action" Clauses Prohibiting Bondholder Suits against the
Obligor, 62 YALE L.J. 1097, 1098-99 (1953) (“[T]he ‘no action’ clause
precludes specious suits instigated by attorneys who hope to receive
lucrative fees from a true class action for all [debt]holders. And the debtor
corporation is insulated from unwise court action by a few panicky
[debt]holders, or from a possible multiplicity of suits engendered by
individual [debt]holders' actions.”) (internal citations omitted); Florida Nat.
Bank of Jacksonville v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 123 Fla. 525, 538
(1936).
Id. at 1099-1100 (“[I]n occasional circumstances, insistence on literal
compliance with the “no action” clause might completely paralyze
[debt]holders whose interests are being harmed.”).
4

14 N.Y. JUR. 2D BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS § 336 (2015) (“Reasonable
restrictions on the right of action of an individual holder of corporate bonds
or other obligations, either in respect of the obligation or the security or
both, have generally been upheld as valid.”); Quadrant Structured Products
Co. v. Vertin, 23 N.Y.3d 549, 565 (2014) (“Defendants are correct that
generally a no-action clause prevents minority securityholders from
pursuing litigation against the issuer, in favor of a single action initiated by
a Trustee upon request of a majority of the securityholders . . . .”); Dietzel
v. Anger, 8 Cal. 2d 373, 376 (1937) (“The great majority of the cases hold
the restrictive provision valid on the theory that the [debt]holders have, by
agreement among themselves, imposed a condition precedent to the
exercise of the right of any one of them to sue individually.”)..
5

and, finally, to make drafting recommendations to the reader. This
Article will focus on the application and interpretation of no action
clauses under New York law, since New York law governs the vast
majority of corporate debt indentures.6 In particular, this Article will
analyze issues addressed in the New York Court of Appeals’ decision
in Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin (hereafter
“Quadrant”) 7 and the 11th Circuit’s decision in Akanthos Capital
Mgmt., LLC v. CompuCredit Holdings Corp (hereafter “Akanthos”).8
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part II will explain the
general background, development, and mechanics of a no action
clause. In particular, Part I will explain the general standards of
interpretation and exceptions to no action clauses that have been
recognized in New York courts. Next, Part III will introduce and
detail recent decisions construing New York law that involve the
enforceability of a no action clause. Specifically, Part III will explain
how the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Quadrant increases
the probability that a New York court will decline to enforce a no
action clause under certain conditions. Finally, Part IV will outline
lessons learned from Quadrant and Akanthos can help a drafter
maximize the probability that New York courts will enforce a no
action clause in their indenture. The Article will conclude with a
summation at Part V.

REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS § 12:136 (2015) (“. . . most corporate
indentures and many loan documents are governed by New York law and
are to be litigated in New York courts . . . .”). Many indentures that are
drafted in other states will contain a choice-of-law provision that specifies
that New York Law will govern the indenture. See Akanthos Capital
Mgmt., LLC v. CompuCredit Holdings Corp., 677 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th
Cir. 2012) (“The trust indentures have a choice-of-law provision specifying
that New York law governs the agreement.”).
6

7
8

Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co. v. Vertin, 23 N.Y.3d 549 (2014).

Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC, 677 F.3d at 1292. In this case, the 11th
Circuit interpreted New York law.

II. GENERAL BACKGROUND AND MECHANICS OF A NO ACTION
CLAUSE
A. BACKGROUND
A no action clause limits the ability of individual or small
groups of debtholders to sue issuers by vesting the debtholder’s right
to sue in a third party, the trustee.9 The third party trustee effectively
holds legal title to the securities. 10 No action clauses for debt
instruments are found in the indenture, which is a written agreement
between the parties that sets forth, among other things, the
obligations of the issuer, the debtholder’s rights and remedies in the
event the issuer defaults, as well as the responsibilities of the
trustee.11 For actions within the scope of the no action clause, it is
the trustee, not the debtholder(s), who must bring suit.12 No action
clauses can make bringing suit against an issuer an expensive and
time-consuming endeavor.13
No action clauses have been regularly upheld and enforced in
the vast majority of jurisdictions, including New York. 14 The
9

Conflict of Interests Between Indenture Trustee and Bondholders:
Avoidance of "No Action" Clauses Prohibiting Bondholder Suits against the
Obligor, 62 YALE L.J. 1097, 1098-99 (1953) (“Under the ‘no action’
clause, [debt]holders' rights to sue the corporate debtor are vested in an
independent trustee . . . .”).
10

Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co., 23 N.Y. at 555 (noting that an indenture
is “a written agreement that bestows legal title of the securities in a single
Trustee . . . .”) (citing George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 250 at 280 (2d ed. rev. 1992)).
11

Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co., 23 N.Y.3d at 555.

12

Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 111 N.Y.S.2d 539, 545 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1952) (“[O]rdinarily a request upon a trustee to take action must be
made by the holders of the prescribed percentage of bonds before a class
action may be instituted by a [debt]holder.”). Exceptions to this are
discussed infra.
13

James Gadsden, Indenture "No-Action" Clauses Bar Independent Claims
by Securityholders, 130 BANKING L.J. 226, 228 (2013).
14 N.Y. JUR. 2D BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS § 336 (2015) (“Reasonable
restrictions on the right of action of an individual holder of corporate bonds
. . . have generally been upheld as valid.”); Dietzel v. Anger, 8 Cal. 2d 373,
376 (1937) (“The great majority of the cases hold the restrictive provision
14

common rationale cited by courts in enforcing no action clauses is
that debtholders, in effect, impose the restrictions on themselves.15
Parties to an issuance of debt have the opportunity to review a no
action clause before executing the indenture, giving debtholders
ample opportunity to object or renegotiate the clause if they see fit.16
In the same way, subsequent purchasers may review the indenture
and no action clause before buying bonds. However, scholarship
suggests that debtholders rarely do so.17
No action clauses have a long history of litigation, despite the
presence of a substantial amount of case law supporting their general
enforceability.
In fact, litigation over the interpretation and
enforcement of no action clauses has occurred for over 70 years,
particularly since the seminal case of Birn v. Childs Co. was decided
in New York in 1942. 18 Cases such as Birn and Rabinowitz v.
Kaiser-Frazer Corp. provide an early glimpse into the way New
York courts interpret no action clauses.19 The general principles of
valid on the theory that the [debt]holders have, by agreement among
themselves, imposed a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of
any one of them to sue individually.”)..
Dietzel v. Anger, 8 Cal. 2d 373, 376 (1937) (“The great majority of the
cases hold the restrictive provision valid on the theory that the [debt]holders
have, by agreement among themselves, imposed a condition precedent to
the exercise of the right of any one of them to sue individually.”).
15

16

Feldbaum v. McCrory Corp., No. CIV. A. 11866, 1992 WL 119095, at *7
(Del. Ch. June 2, 1992) (“[I]n consenting to no-action clauses by
purchasing bonds, plaintiffs waive their rights to bring claims that are
common to all [debt]holders, and thus can be prosecuted by the trustee,
unless they first comply with the procedures set forth in the clause or their
claims are for the payment of past-due amounts.”).
17

Efrat Lev, Adv., The Indenture Trustee: Does It Really Protect
Bondholders?, 8 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 47, 49 (1999) (“Unfortunately,
[debt]holders are usually unaware of the existence of the indenture, let
alone its specific provisions.”).
18

Birn v. Childs Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d 689 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1942). While this
case is a seminal case, it is not the earliest. Some disputes concerning issues
related to no action clauses date back to the 19th Century. See Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. N. Pac. R. Co., 66 F. 169, 170 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1895)
(noting issues with trustee conflicts of interest).
19

See generally Birn, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 689; Rabinowitz v. Kaiser-Frazer
Corp., 111 N.Y.S.2d at 539.

law introduced in Birn and Rabinowtiz are alive and well today.20 In
addition, Rabinowitz and Birn established common law exceptions to
the general rule that trustees, rather than debtholders, must bring suit
under causes of action that fall within the scope of the no action
clause.
I. GENERAL INTERPRETATION OF NO ACTION CLAUSES

As a general rule, aA trust indenture is a contract, which
means that the interpretation and construction of a no action clause
contained in an indenture is a matter of basic contract law.21 A no
action clause that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face will
be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms.22 Therefore,
when reading interpreting a no action clause, a court will “give effect
to the precise words and language used.”23
It is well settled that no action clauses will be strictly
construed, and thus read narrowly, and narrowly read by New York
courts.24 In addition, New York courts’ commonly apply the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius may apply while interpreting no
action clauses. 25 Under this theory, where a no action clause
20

The precedent of Birn and Rabinowitz concerning trustee-related
exceptions for unreasonable refusal to sue and conflicts of interest are still
valid under modern New York law. See Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC v.
CompuCredit Holdings Corp., 677 F.3d 1286, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012)
(“Although courts applying New York law have found no-action clauses
applicable as a general rule, they have been willing to abrogate that rule
under one consistently acknowledged exception: when the trustee, by
reason of conflict of interest or unjustifiable unwillingness, cannot properly
pursue a remedy for trust beneficiaries.”).
21

Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin, 23 N.Y.3d 549, 559 (2014)
(citing Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039,
1049 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 19.1, at 467 (6th ed.) (referring to indenture as
a contract).
22

Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co., 23 N.Y.3d at 559-60.

23

Id. at 60.

24

Id.

25

Id.; MeehanCombs Glob. Credit Opportunities Funds, LP v. Caesars
Entm't Corp., 80 F. Supp. 3d 507, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

expressly describes a particular cause of action, thing, or person to
which it shall apply, a court will draw an irrefutable inference that
what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted and
excluded.26
II. EXCEPTIONS TO NO ACTION CLAUSES
Under certainsome circumstances, no action clauses are
unenforceable and inoperative regardless of the language used or
conditions contained in the clause. 27 In particular, there are two
trustee-related exceptions that will render a no action clause
unenforceable: (1) unreasonable refusal by the trustee to bring suit,28
and (2) conflict of interest of the trustee.29
First, a no action clause is unenforceable where a trustee
unreasonably refuses to sue the issuer. 30 This exception can be
studied by analyzing Birn. In Birn, the plaintiffs owned debt
securities issued by Childs Co. 31 Pursuant to the indenture that
governed the plaintiff’s securities, debtholders brought suit seeking
to require the issuer, Childs Co., to comply with the terms of a bond
indenture requiring the Childs Co. was required to payyment
certainof funds to a sinking fund. 32 The plaintiffs alleged that, at
some point, Childs Co. defaulted on this obligation by not making the
payments. 33 Pursuant to a no action clause found in the debt
indenture, tThe debtholders plaintiffs in Birn provided the trustee,
Empire Trust Company, with adequate notice of default and
requested that the trustee bring suit.34 However, the trustee refused
26

Calenzo v. Shah, 976 N.Y.S.2d 555, 558 (2013) (describing the general
effect of expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
27

See generally Birn v. Childs Co., 37 N.Y.S.2d at 689; Rabinowitz v.
Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 111 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
28

Birn, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 689.

29

Rabinowitz, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 546.

30

Birn, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 697.

31

Id. at 689.

Id. at 696 (“Plaintiff gave the trustee written notice of what she claimed
and I have found to be a completed event of default, viz., failure to comply
with the sinking fund provision.”).
32

33

Id.

34

Id.

to sue, insisting that no default had occurred.35 The Birn court found
for the plaintiff, holding that a debtholder may bypass the trustee and
sue the issuer directly where: (1) the trustee, after receiving proper
notice and opportunity to bring suit, refuses to sue, and (2) the
trustee’s refusal to bring suit is unreasonable.36 Therefore, a trustee’s
unreasonable refusal to bring suit will render a no-action clause
unenforceable, and the plaintiffs may sue the issuer directly.
Second, a no action clause is unenforceable where the trustee
has a conflict of interest, as demonstrated in Rabinowitz. In
Rabinowitz, debtholders, once again, sued the issuer to enforce a
sinking fund provision in the bond indenture.37 The issuer moved to
dismiss, claiming that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the conditions
precedent to suit under the indenture’s no action clause.38 While the
Rabinowtiz Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the
conditions of the no action clause, the court held that the clause was
inoperative 39 because the trustee, Bank of America, had created a
conflict of interest by loaning money to the issuer after the indenture
was executed. 40 The Rabinowtiz Court definitively stated, “[a]A
trustee cannot be permitted to assume a position inconsistent with or
in opposition to his trust. His duty is single, and he cannot serve two
masters with antagonistic interests.” 41 Consequently, Rabinowitz
holds that a conflict of interest between a trustee and an issuer can
render a no action clause unenforceable.42
In sum, a no action clause, while strictly construed, will be
interpreted under the basic tenants of contract law. Specifically, New
35

Id.

Id. at 697 (“Equity also allows other beneficiaries to sue upon causes of
action vested in their trustees when the trustee unreasonably refuses to
sue.”).
36

37

Rabinowitz, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 542(“It is this failure of [issuer] to have
assumed the obligations of the sinking fund and to have paid 25% of its
annual profits into such fund which presents the crux of this case . . . .”).
38

Id. at 540.

Id. at 547 (“[I]t is my view that the ‘no action’ clause involved in the case
at bar is inoperative and inapplicable.”).
39

40

Id. at 546.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 547.

York courts will attempt to give effect to the plain language of the
clause, while also incorporating the maxim of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. While the general enforceability of no action
clauses is not widely disputed, drafters should be mindful that there
are two trustee-related exceptions that will render no action clauses
unenforceable: (1) unreasonable refusal on the part of the trustee to
bring suit when requested, and (2) trustee conflicts of interest.
B. MECHANICS OF A NO ACTION CLAUSE
A conventional no action clause prevents debtholder(s) from
bringing suit directly against an issuer, unless: (1) the type of action
the issuer wants to bring falls outside the scope of the no action
clause, (2) the debtholder(s)plaintiffs satisfy conditions set out in the
no action clause, 43 or (3) a common law trustee-related exception
applies, such as conflict of interest.44 To understand the mechanics
of a no action clause, it is best to analyze one. A typical no action
clause looks like this:
Limitation on Suits. A Securityholder may pursue a
remedy with respect to this Indenture or the Securities
only if:
(1) the Holder gives to the Trustee notice of a continuing
Event of Default;
(2) the Holders of at least 25% in principal amount of the
Securities make a request to the Trustee to pursue the
remedy;

Gadsen, supra note 137, at 1097-98 (“[B]ondholders may not sue the
corporation unless the trustee fails to act after holders of a specified amount
of indenture securities make written request upon the trustee for action and
offer the trustee indemnity for its expenses.”) (internal citations omitted).
These two conditions in particular are commonly found in no-action
clauses.
43

Rabinowitz, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (“ . . . an individual [debt]holder has the
right to bring a class action to protect his interests . . . whenever the
Indenture Trustee has acted in such a manner as to put itself in a position
where it cannot faithfully and competently discharge its duty as a
fiduciary.”).
44

(3) such Holder or Holders offer to the Trustee indemnity
satisfactory to the Trustee against any loss, liability or
expense;
(4) the Trustee does not comply with the request within
60 days after receipt of the request and the offer of
indemnity; and
(5) during such 60-day period the Holders of a majority
in principal amount of the Securities do not give the
Trustee a direction inconsistent with the request.45
I. SCOPE OF THE CLAUSE

When analyzing the sample no action clause, one should take
particular notice of the scope of the clause. This particular no action
clause applies to suits arising both under the indenture and the
underlying securities. This is significant, as Quadrant held that if the
no action clause fails to does explicitly state that the no action clause
is applicable to suits arising from the underlying securities, the
maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius will apply and limit
the scope of a no action clause to actions arising under the
indenture.46 This would exclude causes of action arising under the
underlying securities. This will be discussed in more detail infra at
Part II and Part III. In addition, the sample clause states that it
applies to “Securityholders.” In defining the parties to whom the
indenture applies, dDespite this, drafters should be cautious, as New
York law sometimes permits non-parties to an indenture–such as
directors or officers–to assert and enforce a no action clause.47
II. CONDITIONS OF THE CLAUSE
The conditions debtholder(s) are required to meet to bring suit
under the sample no action clause are common. First, the clause
45

Gadsden, supra note 132, at 1228.

Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co., 23 N.Y.3d at 552 (“[W]e conclude that
a trust indenture's ‘no-action’ clause that specifically precludes enforcement
of contractual claims arising under the indenture, but omits reference to ‘the
Securities,’ does not bar a securityholder's independent common-law or
statutory claims.”).
46

Akanthos Capital Mgmt., LLC, 677 F.3d at 1292 (“A number of courts
applying New York law . . . have held that non-party defendants may still
assert the no-action clause.”).
47

requires the debtholder to give the trustee notice of the default. In
addition to notice, the debtholder(s) must give the trustee 60 days to
sue before bringing suit themselves. This gives the trustee time to
evaluate the claim and determine whether the conditions of the no
action clause have been satisfied and the claim is legitimate.
Perhaps the most notable and, for debtholders, pesky
condition contained in the sample no action clause is the requirement
that the debtholder(s) who is petitioning the trustee to bring suit must
be joined by the holders of at least 25% of the bondssecurities. This
condition is standard and the figure of 25% is customary and
regularly enforced. 48 This condition can be difficult and time
consuming for debtholder(s) to satisfy. However, the Trust Indenture
Act (the “TIA”) helps small debtholder(s) comply with these types of
conditions, as the TIA requires issuers to furnish trustees with a list
of all debtholders’ names and addresses.49 This disclosure facilitates
communication between debtholders and the trustee and enables
small debtholders to find and petition other debtholders to request the
trustee to bring suit in order to comply with the conditions of the no
action clause.
The final conditions in the sample no action clause simply
require aggrieved debtholders to offer an indemnity and respect a 60day holding period where the trustee can analyze the actions of the
debtholders to see if the majority of debtholders undertake direction
inconsistent with the aggrieved debtholder’s request. While the
conditions in the sample no action clause are typical; individual,
negotiated no action clauses may be different. Therefore, drafters
should compare their no action clause with precedent in order to
understand the way any changes from precedent could affect a
court’s interpretation of their clause. Having discussed the general
background and mechanics of no actions clauses, the next step
involves understanding case law that aeffects the general application
and interpretation of no action clauses.

48

Gadsden, supra note 132, at 1228 (“The 25% figure is standard.”).

15 U.S.C. § 77lll (1990) (“Each obligor upon the indenture securities
shall furnish or cause to be furnished . . . all information in the possession
or control of such obligor, or of any of its paying agents, as to the names
and addresses of the indenture security holders.”).
49

III. THE IMPACT OF QUADRANT AND AKANTHOS
While drafting no action clauses under New York law,
drafters may find it helpful to analyze past court decisions that have
interpreted no action clauses when making drafting decisions.
Having already explained the general rules of interpretation for no
action clauses, this Part will focus on lessons that can be learned by
analyzing recent court decisions interpreting that interpret no action
clauses under New York law. This section will focus on a crucial
lesson found in Quadrant, as well as important precedent established
in the 11th Circuit’s decision in Akanthos.
A. QUADRANT
In Quadrant, the New York Court of Appeals provided
guidance concerning the scope of no action clauses.50 The facts are
relatively simple. Athilon Capital Corp (“Athilon”) is a company
that, along with a wholly owned subsidiary, sold credit derivatives
products, such as credit default swaps. 51 To finance its business,
Athlon raised over $600 million by issuing three classes of notes: (1)
$350 million in senior subordinated notes, (2) $200 million in three
different series of subordinated notes, and (3) $50 million in junior
notes.52 Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. (“Quadrant”),
the plaintiff, owned several classes of the subordinated notes,
including some senior subordinated notes.53 A third company, EBF
& Associates, L.P. (“EBP”) acquired Athilon in 2010, owned the
junior notes, and controlled Athilon’s bBoard of dDirectors.54 The
notes issued by Athilon were accompanied by indentures containing
no action clauses, which were governed by New York law.55
Quadrant brought suit in Delaware against Athilon, Athilon's
officers and directors, EBF, and others, alleging breaches of fiduciary
duty and fraudulent transfer claims and seeking damages and
50

Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co., 23 N.Y.3d at 553.

51

Id.

52

Id. at 554.

53

Id. at 554-55.

54

Id. at 553.

55

Id. at 556-57.

injunctive relief. 56 Quadrant claimed that Athilon’s bBoard of
directors, which is controlled by EBP, “failed to preserve Athilon's
value in anticipation of liquidation in 2014” and breached its
fiduciary duty by making payments on its junior notes, to the
detriment of the senior subordinated securities, such as those owned
by Quadrant.57
In response, the defendant’s moved to dismiss the lawsuit on
the grounds that Quadrant’s suit was barred by the debt indenture’s
no action clause.58 The indenture’s no action clause provided that:
No holder of any Security shall have any right by virtue
or by availing of any provision of this Indenture to
institute any action or proceeding at law or in equity or in
bankruptcy or otherwise upon or under or with respect to
this Indenture . . . .59
In addition, the indenture required that “the holders of not less than
50% of the aggregate principal amount of the relevant series of
Securities at the time Outstanding” make request to the trustee to
bring suit.60 This is in contrast to the standard figure of 25%.61
The Delaware Chancery Court agreed with the defendants and
dismissed Quadrant’s lawsuit, holding that the no action clause
barred the plaintiff’s claims. 62 However, on appeal, Quadrant
argued, for the first time, that the no action clause contained in
Athilon’s indentures was inapplicable since the clause applied only to
claims arising out of the indenture and therefore could not bar
common-law or statutory claims arising under the securities.63 This
defense arose from the fact that the language of the no action clause
stated that it applied to claims arising under the indenture, rather than
claims arising under the indenture or the Securities, as was the case
56

Id. at 556.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 556-57.

60

Id. at 557.

61

Gadsden, supra note 132, at 1228 (“The 25% figure is standard.”).

62

Quadrant Structured Prod.’s Co., 23 N.Y.3d at 557.

63

Id. at 558.

in past precedent.64 The Delaware Supreme Court remanded the case
back to the Delaware Chancery Court with instructions that the
Chancery Court issue an opinion analyzing the significance (if any)
under New York law of the differences between [the precedent clause
and Athilon’s clause]. 65 The report concluded that the no action
clause was limited in scope and only applied to “actions or
proceedings where a securityholder claims a right by virtue or by
availing of any provision of the indenture.” 66 The Delaware
Supreme Court then certified two questions at issue to the New York
Court of Appeals.67
First, the New York Court of Appeals held that “a no-action
clause which by its language applies to rights and remedies under the
provisions of the indenture agreement, but makes no mention of
individual suits on the securities, does not preclude enforcement of a
debtholder’s independent common-law or statutory rights.” 68 In
coming to this conclusion, the Quadrant Court reasoned that the no
action clause at issue, “with its specific limit on the enforcement of
indenture contract rights,” was in contrast to more standard no action
clauses that also cover securities-based claims. 69 Furthermore, the
court cited the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius as
supporting its conclusion.70 The defendants attempted to argue that
“references to the indenture should be interpreted to include the
securities, and that to do otherwise will upset the parties'
expectations.” However, the court dismissed this argument as
unconvincing and unsupported by precedent and the plain language
of the clause/indenture.71
The Quadrant Court makes it clear that any language in a no
action clause that states that the clause shall apply or not apply to

64

Id. at 558-59.

65
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certain claims will be strictly enforced and narrowly construed. 72 In
addition, under the precedent established by this decision, if a drafter
wants a no action clause to apply to claims arising from the
underlying securities, in addition to those arising under an indenture,
the clause must explicitly say so. 73 Further drafting tips and
suggestions from this precedent are addressed infra at Part III.
B. AKANTHOS
In Akanthos, the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting
New York law, provided clarity concerning who may invoke the
protections of a no action clause.74 The plaintiffs in Akanthos owned
convertible notes issued by the defendant, CompuCredit Holdings
Corp. 75 In 2009, the plaintiffs sued the defendant in the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging
violations of Georgia’s Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act. 76 The
defendant moved to dismiss, claiming the lawsuit was barred by a no
action clause contained in the notes’ indenture.77 The federal district
court held that the no action clause was inapplicable to the claims
brought by the plaintiffs, thus defeating the defendant’s motion to
dismiss. 78 On interlocutory appeal, the 11th Circuit reversed the
district court, holding that the no action clause was operative and
barred the plaintiff noteholders from bringing suit.79
Before the 11th Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that the no
action clause in the indenture was inapplicable because the parties
seeking to enforce the no action clause, officers and directors of the
defendant, were not parties to the indenture.80 This argument centers
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Id. at 1292 (“Plaintiffs also argue that the applicability of the no-action
clause cannot properly be asserted by persons-such as Officers and
Directors-who are not parties to the indentures containing that clause.”).
80

on the scope of a no action clause. 81 Can defendants who are not
parties to an indenture invoke the protection of a no action clause? In
answering this question, the 11th Circuit held that “non-party
defendants may still assert [a] no-action clause.”82 In reaching this
decision, the Akanthos Court cited numerous opinions by New York
courts that allowed non-parties to an indenture to invoke the
protections of a no action clause. 83 The court reasoned that
noteholders effectively waive their right to sue when they execute a
no action clause and that this waiver “applies equally to claims
against non-issuer defendants as to claims against issuers.”84 This is
particularly true with no action clauses that “explicitly make their
scope depend on the nature of the claims brought, not on the identity
of the defendant.” 85 Accordingly, the 11th Circuit overruled the
district court’s holding and enforced the no action clause.86
Akanthos teaches drafters, and potential plaintiffs, a crucial
lesson concerning the scope of no action clauses; defendants who are
not parties to the underlying indenture may, depending on the
language of the clause, be entitled tocan enforce no action clauses.
This can be a problem for plaintiff noteholders, since Akanthos
81

Id. (noting that an issue contestedone of the contested issues was the
applicability of the no action clause).
82

Id.

Id.; see Peak Partners, LP v. Republic Bank, 191 F. App’x 118, 126-–27
(3d Cir. 2006) (applying New York law) (finding no-action clause
applicable despite plaintiff's argument that defendant was not a party to the
trust indenture); Sterling Fed. Bank, F.S.B. v. DLJ Mortg. Capital, Inc.,
2010 WL 3324705, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug.20, 2010) (applying New York
law) (holding that no-action clause barred plaintiff from bringing suit
against mortgage-servicer defendant who was not party to the trust
indenture).
83
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Id. (citing Feldbaum v. McCrory Corp., 1992 WL 119095, at *8 (Del.Ch.
June 2, 1992) (applying New York law) (finding that “in consenting to noaction clauses by purchasing bonds, plaintiffs waive their rights to bring
claims that are common to all debtholders,” and that waiver “applies
equally to claims against non-issuer defendants as to claims against
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Id. at 1298 (“[W]e REVERSE and REMAND for dismissal of Plaintiffs'
claims.”).
86

broadens the scope of parties protected by a no action clause. 87
However, Akanthos also suggests a solution to this problem. If a
noteholder or issuer wants to limit the number of parties who
canallowed to enforce a no action clause, Akanthos suggests that
inserting language explicitly limiting the parties who may enforce a
no action clause may be effective. 88 This solution is hinted in the
court’s citation of Feldbaum, where the court states that the general
rule of allowing non-parties to an indenture to enforce a no action
clause is especially applicable where clauses “explicitly make their
scope depend on the nature of the claims brought, not on the identity
of the defendant.” 89 This suggests that where a no action clause
expressly makes the scope of the no action clause dependent on the
identity of the defendant, as well as the nature of the claim, then a
court will be less likely to allow non-parties to an indenture to
enforce a no action clause. This approach is also consistent with a
basic tenants of contracts; enforcing the plain meaning of a clause.
Quadrant and Akanthos provide drafters, potential plaintiffs
and defendants with guidance concerning how New York courts will
interpret a no action clause. The most important lesson drafters can
take away from these cases is that specificity and precision in
drafting will pay a crucial role in the application and effectiveness of
a no action clause. Using the precedent set in Quadrant and
Akanthos, along with analyzing the basic rules of interpretation for
no action clauses discussed supra in Part I, we may now move
forward to Part III, which will make suggestions to drafters.

IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
After discussing and analyzing the general rules of
interpretation for no action clauses, as well as the precedent of
87

Id. at 1292 (noting that non parties to an indenture can enforce a no
action clause under New York law).
88

Id. (noting that the general rule allowing non-parties to an indenture to
enforce a no action clause is especially applicable where the clause
“explicitly make their scope depend on the nature of the claims brought, not
on the identity of the defendant.”).
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Quadrant and Akanthos, it is clear that no action clauses, while
generally enforceable, will be strictly and narrowly construed. 90
Therefore when drafting, counsel to an issuer can maximize the
likelihood that their no action clause will be enforced in New York
by following a few simple suggestions.
A. BE CAREFUL WHEN SELECTING A TRUSTEE
To begin, one shouldpractitioners should counsel clients to be
careful when selecting a trustee.91 The malfeasance or nonfeasance
of a trustee can render well drafted no action clauses unenforceable.92
In particular, since trustee conflicts of interest may render a no-action
clause inapplicable, clients should undertake due diligence on the
trustee to make sure that no potential conflicts of interests arise after
the execution of the indenture.93 It is notable that Rabinowitz deals
with a conflict of interest that arose after the execution of the
indenture, so conflicts that precede an indenture may possibly be
resolved by waiver or other means.94
Avoiding trustee conflicts of interest is undoubtedly
advantageous for an issuer. 95 For example, if the defendant in
Rabinowitz had realized that receiving a loan from the trustee, Bank
of America, would invalidate their no action clause, the defendant
could have either sought financing from another source, or appointed
another trustee, or sought a waiver. 96 If the defendant had taken
these actions, the no action clause in Rabinowitz would have likely
90
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creditor of both Graham-Paige and Kaiser-Frazer.”) (emphasis added).
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been enforced and the plaintiff’s lawsuit dismissed. 97 Therefore,
drafters should urge their client to use caution when selecting a
trustee and establish safeguards to prevent trustee conflicts of interest
from arising.
In addition to taking steps to ensure that trustee conflicts of
interest do not invalidate theeir no action clause, counsel should also
make sure that trustees are aware of their duties and care competent
to execute them. For example, under the model no action clause in
Part I(b), if the trustee fails to take action within 60 days, a
debtholder may bypass the trustee and sue directly, provided all the
other conditions are satisfied. 98 This means that inactivity or
nonfeasance by the trustee can make it easier for disgruntled
debtholders to sue. In addition, it is well established that the
malfeasance of a trustee can invalidate a no action clause where a
trustee unreasonably refuses to sue an issuer. 99 While this issue
should rarely cause a problem, since most appointed trustees are
large financial institutions , such as Bank of America, counsel would
be wise to vet potential trustees for competency, as well as conflicts
of interest.
B. DRAFT NO ACTION CLAUSES WITH SPECIFICITY AND
PRECISION
After carefully selecting a trustee, counsel should be careful to
draft their no action clause with specificity and precision. Quadrant
and Akanthos are two examples of cases where a no action clause
could have been effective, but was not, due to the language the
drafter chose to use.100 When it comes to no action clauses, details
matter, particularly since courts will “give effect to the precise words
and language used” in a no action clause. 101 For example, in
Quadrant, if the drafter of Athlon’s no action clause had simply
97
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stated that the no action clause prohibited any action “upon or under
or with respect to this Indenture or the Securities,” then Quadrant’s
lawsuit may have been dismissed.102 This is particularly true since
the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a factor the court
relied upon when reaching its conclusion, would not have applied
had the drafter included “the Securities” in the clause. Quadrant is a
shining example of how good, precedent-informed drafting can make
or break a no action clause. Indeed, it is arguable that, in light of the
Quadrant decision, one should always include the “Securities” in the
scope of a no action clause, unless there is a particular justification
for its omission.
Further reinforcing the idea that precise drafting is critical, the
Akanthos decision suggests that anyone may enforce a no action
clause unless the clause says otherwise.103 From the perspective of
debtholders’ counsel, it would be wise, if possible, to negotiate limits
on parties who can enforce a no action clause. This would make it
easier to sue non-parties to the indenture.
If the indenture in
Akanthos, via express language, only permitted parties to the
indenture to enforce the no action clause, then it is likely that the
Akanthos Court would have held that the no action clause at issue
was inapplicable and the lawsuit against the directors and officers of
the issuer, non-parties to the indenture, could have continued. 104
However, from a trustee and issuer’s perspective, it may benefit
issuers to allow anyone to enforce the clause, since that interpretation
would extend protection to not just the issuer, but also its officers and
directors.105
All in all, while no action clauses are strictly construed and
narrowly read, New York courts have made it clear that they will
enforce the plain meaning of the terms used in a no action clause,
giving effect to the precise words and language used. 106 Specific,
precedent-informed drafting could have changed the outcomes of
102
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Quadrant and Akanthos, so counsel should always consider
precedent and the particular risks/needs of their client before drafting
a no action clause.
C. BE MINDFUL OF SCOPE
Drafters should always be cognizant of the scope of a no action
clause’s scope. It is easy to simply copy and paste a form no action
clause from a precedent transaction, but good drafters should always
evaluate the scope of the sample clause before inserting it into their
indenture. As mentioned supra, be mindful of whether the clause
applies only to actions arising under the indenture, or whether the
clause also forbids lawsuits arising from the underlying securities.
Issuers’ counsel will likely desire for the scope of the no action
clause to be as broad as possible, while debtholders may undoubtedly
wantdesire a narrower clause. Finally, remember that the maxim of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies when considering the
scope of no action clauses, particularly, in terms of parties who can
enforce the clause and in terms of claims that fall under the clause’s
protection.107 Whenhile this maxim applies, terms that are omitted
from a no action clause will be assumed to be intentional omissions,
as was the case in Quadrant.108
D. EVALUATE THE CONDITIONS OF THE NO ACTION CLAUSE
Finally, the conditions of a no action clause are of paramount
concern when drafting a no action clause. Ideally, the conditions will
be strict enough to prevent specious lawsuits from a small number of
debtholders,, but lenient enough to allow a substantial number of
debtholders to sue for legitimate grievances.109 The most important
107
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Id. (“Even where there is ambiguity, if parties to a contract omit
terms—particularly, terms that are readily found in other, similar
contracts—the inescapable conclusion is that the parties intended the
omission. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, as used in the
interpretation of contracts, supports precisely this conclusion.”)
108
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Conflict of Interests Between Indenture Trustee and Debtholders:
Avoidance of "No Action" Clauses Prohibiting Debtholder Suits against the
Obligor, 62 YALE L.J. 1097, 1098-99 (1953) (“[T]he ‘no action’ clause
precludes specious suits instigated by attorneys who hope to receive
lucrative fees from a true class action for all debtholders. And the debtor

condition set by issuers is the requisite number of debtholders who
must petition the trustee to sue. As mentioned supra, a condition that
requires holders of 25% of all outstanding bonds or notes to request a
trustee to sue is standard and often enforced.110
However, the indenture in Quadrant set a much higher
standard, requiring that “holders of not less than 50% of the
aggregate principal amount of the relevant series of Securities”
petition the trustee.111 While the figure of 25% is standard, Quadrant
suggests that issuer’s counsel has some leeway in setting this
condition, since the Quadrant court didn’t invalidate the clause due
to the 50% figure. 112 Indeed, increasing the number from 25% to
50% makes it more difficult for debtholders to sue, which makes
increasing the figure attractive for issuers. For safety’s sake,
however, conservative issuers should stick with the 25% requirement
since 25% is standard and there is always a risk that a court may
invalidate a no action clause that contains draconianwith too harsh of
conditions as void on public policy grounds.113
Finally, drafters should make sure that trustees have sufficient
time to review claims and petitions to sue in order to faithfully
execute their duties as a trustee. To this end, a condition, such as the
example provided supra in the model no action clause that allows
debtholders to bypass the trustee only after 60 days of inaction on the
part of the trustee is recommended. This condition gives the trustee
sufficient time to review the claim and evaluate its legitimacy.
Therefore, sticking with this condition and 60-day time frame, as
noted in the model no action clause in Part I, is advisable.
V. CONCLUSION

issuers.

In conclusion, no action clauses can be a powerful tool for
The no action clause prevents specious and frivolous

corporation is insulated from unwise court action by a few panicky
debtholders, or from a possible multiplicity of suits engendered by
individual debtholders' actions.”) (internal citations omitted).
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lawsuits by small debtholders, yet allows a substantial number of
debtholders with legitimate grievances to litigate their claims.
Furthermore, the no action clause prevents a small number of
debtholders from suing the company where the suit is antagonistic to
the majority of debtholders. In drafting no action clauses, counsel
should vet potential trustees for conflicts of interest and competence
and compare precedent clauses with the particular needs of their
transaction. Most importantly, counsel should always draft with
specificity and precision, since New York courts will enforce the
plain meaning of a no action clause. By learning from the precedent
of cases such as Quadrant and Akanthos, as well as considering the
scope and conditions of their particular clause, drafters can maximize
the probability that New York courts will enforce their indenture’s no
action clause.

